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1. Introduction 
Hedge Funds (HFs) are investment pools that raise capital from large institutions and wealthy investors 
but not from the general public. HFs are a dynamic part of the world’s financial system and develop 
and use some of the most innovative investment and risk management strategies with the goal of 
mitigating risk and enhancing returns performance. On the other hand, HFs are very active players in 
the financial derivatives market which stimulates market liquidity and facilitates the flow of capital. 
Despite these benefits, HFs are also often regarded as major contributors to financial instability and as 
taking unjustified benefits from the lack of regulations and transparency in the financial markets, as 
well as for being dangerously leveraged and too engaged in short selling.  
Hedge fund managers (HFM) and investors, as well as financial regulators, should, therefore, 
understand the relationship between HF returns and the characteristics that enable them to generate 
absolute returns in excess of other traditional investment vehicles. 
This paper reviews the HF literature focused on the HF returns and the related risk management 
strategies. It also classifies the literature considering the most recent contributions and the regulatory 
developments after the 2007 financial crisis and suggests new avenues for research considering the 
critical problems which have not yet been adequately addressed. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we identify and categorize the HF return 
characteristics. In section 3 we review an extensive number of articles focused on the HF industry’s risk 
management characteristics and developments in their risk management behaviour patterns that have 
occurred in the last two decades. In section 4 we conclude.  
2. HF returns characteristics 
2.1. HF returns components and market neutrality 
HF returns can be classified into two main components: Beta and Alpha. Beta is an indicator of the 
volatility of the returns generated from the exposure to different asset classes, whereas alpha represents 
the return generated as a consequence of the manager’s skill. These concepts are used to classify the 
investment strategies of HFs and to benchmark HF performance. In the literature, both linear single and 
multi-factor models are used to determine the alpha and the beta of HFs, where alpha is the intercept 
term of the regression and betas are the regression coefficients. 
HFs were initially created to reduce market risk by hedging their exposure using a combination of  long 
and short positions on the assets held. Under such circumstances, the correlation between beta and the 
market is low or inexistent. This idea, known as “market neutrality” was studied by Liang (1999) using 
an eight-asset class factor model, who found that HFs were relatively less correlated with the traditional 
asset classes (such as stocks and bonds) than mutual funds, which tend to be highly correlated to market 
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indices such as the S&P500. Patton (2009) classifies market neutrality according to four types: mean, 
variance, value at risk and tail neutrality and like  Liang (1999) also concludes that “most HFs which 
are classified as market neutral are not really market neutral”.  
Building on the Pastor and Stambaugh (2009) finding that serially correlated residuals from predictive 
regression modelling on different HF style portfolios suggest imperfect predictors, Cai and Liang (2012) 
proposed a dynamic linear regression model that could reduce the autocorrelation of the residuals and 
conclude that HFs classified as market neutral are close to a neutral exposure and demonstrate better 
neutrality when compared to riskier equity management styles. Sharpe (1992) proposes a style analysis 
model which includes a linear asset class factor for analyzing mutual funds’ (MFs) styles, where the 
style analysis is considered as a special case of the linear multi-factor model. Fung and Hsieh (1997) 
extend Sharpe’s (1992) model and provide an integrated framework very useful to analyze and classify 
the main components of each HF’s returns according to their strategy type.  More specifically, they 
decompose funds’ return into three components related to where the fund trades (asset class), how the 
fund trades (strategy) and how much the fund trades (leverage). They model HF styles using linear 
combinations of rule-based trading strategies using information from a dataset which comprises 
information on 409 HFs over the time period of 1993 to 1995. By using factor analysis, the authors 
classify five mutually orthogonal principle components: global macro, system traders, 
system/opportunistic, value style, and distress style.  
Brown and Goetzmann (2001) analyze the different HF styles based on a method which is an extension 
of k-mean cluster analysis (i.e. hard and fuzzy clustering) and finds that there are at least eight distinct 
styles used by HFs, where each is associated with a different risk exposure. Bares et al. (2001) use a 
similar methodology and study, among other things, the style consistency of the asset allocation 
strategies. Maillet and Rousset (2003) proposed a theoretical model which utilises the Kohonen 
classification mapping using an algorithmic approach that allows the characterization of the families of 
funds according to their conditional densities. 
<Insert Table 1> 
2.2. Nonlinearity of returns 
The dynamic use of long and short positions in HFs generates a nonlinear relationship between the 
market returns and the HF returns. This raises doubts about the suitability of normal linear-factor 
methods for testing market neutrality. Hence, there is a need for more sophisticated methods to study 
neutrality and to adjust the returns to their corresponding systematic risk factors, and two main 
frameworks have emerged: one is named a bottom-up approach, and is used for instance by Fung and 
Hsieh (2001) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), another is a named a generalized approach, and is used 
for instance by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Dor et al. (2003).  
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The bottom-up approach analyzes the HFs specific strategies separately, starting with underlying 
conventional assets (such as stocks and bonds) to test neutrality and extract the systematic risk factors. 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) developed this approach, which was named asset based style (ABS). They rely 
on Merton (1981), where market timers can hold long positions in the market, and extend it so as to 
allow the trend followers2 to go long and short through the use of option-based investment strategies. 
They also posit that the simplest trend-following strategy (the Primitive trend-following strategy) has 
the same payout as the "lookbacks-straddle” option. In order to replicate the performance of the trend-
following strategy for each market asset, they label the Primitive Trend-Follower Strategy (PTFS) for 
that market and show that these PTFSs capture two essential performance features of trend-following 
funds. First, they show that there is a nonlinear relationship between the trend of the followers’ return 
and the trend of the equity market and confirm that trend-following funds do have a systematic risk and 
are, therefore, not market neutral.  
Using a sample period starting in 1997, where the sample used by  Fung and Hsieh (2001) ends, Fung 
and Hsieh (2007) provide an out of sample verification of their results, demonstrating that their 2001 
model correctly predicts the return behaviour of trend-following strategies for the out of sample periods, 
especially during stressful market conditions such as those of September 2001. Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001) use a sample of 4,750 mergers and acquisitions for the period between 1963 and 1998 to examine 
returns generated from risk arbitrage.3 Their results suggest that risk arbitrage returns are similar to 
those obtained from writing uncovered index put options. They evaluate their results on the assumption 
that a nonlinear relationship with market returns holds, they use a contingent claims analysis. and report 
that the risk arbitrage generates excess returns of around 4% per year.  
Fung et al. (2002) use the ABS approach to extract the common sources of risk related to fixed-income 
HFs.4 This type of trading is very risky because the relative price of two assets can easily diverge. 
Therefore, fixed-income securities are subject to several important risks related to interest rate spreads 
such as convertible/treasury spread, mortgage/treasury spread, and high-yield/treasury spread, being 
sources of risk related to market risk factors. By identifying the ABS factors, they were able to 
determine that the majority of fixed-income HFs are exposed to a large increase in credit spreads. This 
finding has a huge impact on the asset allocation since managers are able to identify the main risk factors 
and therefore to select the components that increase the HF alpha.  
                                                            
2 Trend following is a strategy commonly used by commodity (CTAs). The returns of trend-following trading advisors (funds 
are uncorrelated with the standard equity, bonds, currency, and commodity indices). 
3 Risk arbitrage is an investment strategy where managers attempt to profit from the spread between a target’s stock price and 
offer price, after the announcement of a merger or acquisition.  
4 Fixed-income HFs are considered to follow convergence trading that bets on the relative prices of two assets to converge. 
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Agarwal et al. (2011b) also use the ABS methodology to analyze the risk-return characteristics of 
convertible arbitrage funds.5 They theorize the existence of three “primitive trading strategies” (PTS) 
which can justify the convertible arbitrage fund’s returns.6 Those PTSs can also be considered to be 
ABS factors that explain a significant proportion of the return variation of convertible arbitrage funds. 
Agarwal et al. (2011b) extend the work of Agarwal and Naik (2004) by studying the characteristics of 
the key drivers of convertible arbitrage strategies and their impact on the performance of HF. They 
report that the buy-and-hedge strategy representing long positions in convertible bonds while hedging 
the equity risk alone explains a significant amount of the return variation, and highlight the importance 
of non-price variables, such as extreme market-wide events and the supply of convertible bonds in 
affecting the HF performance.  
The second approach used in analyzing the risk-return characteristics of HFs taking into consideration 
the nonlinear relationship between HF and market returns is known as the “generalized approach”.  
Agarwal and Naik (2004) use buy-and-hold and option-based risk factors to characterize the nonlinear 
systematic risk exposures of a wide range of HF investment strategies and propose a two-step approach, 
where they, first, estimate the factor loadings of HFs using a multi-factor model containing returns on 
standard asset classes and embedded options as risk factors and, second, test how well these risk factors 
capture the out of sample HFs performance. Their results show that it is important to allow for non-
linear risk-return relation. Regarding the non-linear exposure to equity market index, they find that 
hedge funds exhibit significant risk exposures to Fama-French’s (1993) size and value factors. They 
also find that a large number of equity-oriented hedge fund strategies exhibit payoffs resembling a short 
position in a put option on the market index, and therefore bear significant left-tail risk - a risk which is 
ignored by the commonly used mean-variance framework. 
Fung and Hsieh (2004b) extend the work of Fung and Hsieh (2002) on ABS factors and propose  an 
APT-like model of HF returns with dynamic risk factor coefficients where seven risk factors are 
identified, which can explain part of the systematic risk of a typical HF portfolio using conventional 
security prices. This approach provides a framework for measuring HF performance while taking into 
account both time-varying and nonlinear risk characteristics and provides a link between the 
conventional asset class risks and the HF risks. The authors report empirical results showing that the 
seven risk factors explain between 55% and 80% of the return movements of HF portfolios.7 
<Insert Table 2> 
 
                                                            
5 The convertible arbitrage strategy attempts to exploit profits when there is a pricing error made in the conversion factor of 
the convertible security. 
6 These PTSs are: volatility arbitrage, positive carry, and credit arbitrage. 
7 The Seven risk factors are: two equity factors (equity market and size), two fixed-income factors (bond market and credit 
spread), and three trend-following factors for bond, currency, and commodity markets. 
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2.3. HFs’ alphas and their persistency 
There is an extensive empirical literature examining the time-persistency of the HFs’ alphas. For 
instance, Fung and Hsieh's (2004a) regress three HFs indices on the Fama-French three-factor model 
augmented with the momentum factor as implemented by Carhart (1997) and find evidence supporting 
the existence of alpha time-persistency in equity long/short HFs. Kosowski et al. (2007) use a non-
parametric bootstrap methodology and show that there is annual persistency in the HF’s alphas. They 
also find that the differences between the best and the worst funds alphas persist over time although this 
time-persistency is difficult to replicate given that the HFs positioned at the top are often small and 
closed to new investments. In addition, to mitigate the short sample problem they use a Bayesian 
approach which leads to superior performance predictability. They show that sorting on Bayesian alpha 
compared to sorting on ordinary least square (OLS) alpha yields a 5.5% per year increase in the 
Bayesian alphas compared to their OLS alphas.  
Fung et al. (2005) show that alphas play a major role in determining the quality of funds of hedge funds 
(FoHFs). They show that funds having significant and positive alphas (HAVE group) have less 
survivorship risk8 and take smaller beta bets than those that do not have significant and positive alphas 
(HAVE-NOT group) and that the alphas vary over time. More specifically, they divide the sample into 
three sub-samples9 and find that the (HAVE) group exhibit a statistically significant alpha over the three 
periods, whereas the (HAVE-NOT) group only deliver significant alpha during the second period. 
However, for the (HAVE) alpha group they show a declining trend of alpha from the first to the third 
periods, raising the question of what is really affecting alpha. To answer this question they analyze the 
supply of alpha using style analysis for each fund in line with Sharpe (1992) and Fung and Hsieh (1997). 
They find that the supply of alphas is cyclical depending on both market environment and HF style.  
While testing the ability of HFs to generate alpha over time, in line with the Berk and Green (2004) 
model, many studies, including Kosowski et al. (2007), Fung et al. (2008), and Cai and Liang (2012),  
report a declining trend in alpha over time, in addition to a negative effect of a fund’s capital growth on 
its ability to generate alpha. Naik et al. (2007) investigate the reasons behind the substantial decline in 
alpha over the period from 1995 to 2004 and report that capacity constraints at the level of HF strategies 
are responsible for this decline. Fung and Hsieh (2004a) also investigate the alpha time-persistency in 
the equity long/short HFs. After adjusting for risk factors through the implementation of a standard 
four-factor model, they report that less than 20% of the sample exhibits a significant alpha over time. 
Their results confirm those of the Berk and Green (2004) showing a decaying alpha over time. In 
                                                            
8 Survivorship risk occurs when poor performing funds disappear from database by ceasing to report so that only good 
performing funds remain to report their returns. 
9 Pre-LTCM (February 1994 to September 1998), Internet bubble (October 1998 to March 2000) and the most recent period 
(April 2000 to December 2004). 
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addition, they provide a new insight on the main drivers of alpha, which go beyond the conventional 
approach and find that the long/short equity HFs depends on the preferential access to the stock loan 
market and the level of stock market activity (proxied by stock market volume) to deliver higher alpha 
and show that the lower levels of aggregate short sale interest work in enhancing the managers’ ability 
to take more short positions that deliver higher alpha. 
Some authors adopt the alternative explanation of significant and positive alphas being generated by 
managerial skills. In support of their argument, they relate the positive alphas to model misspecification 
or missing risk factors. Bondarenko (2004) finds that “variance risk” can be priced by implementing a 
model-free approach, and its premium risk is negative and economically very large. Linking these 
findings to the HF arena, Bondarenko (2004) argues that HF returns demonstrate negative exposure to 
the variance return10 and this exposure accounts for a large proportion of the average HF return. Hence, 
he provides an alternative explanation for the factors affecting alpha, arguing that this variance return 
is an important factor determining HF returns. 
Aragon (2003) studies the liquidity effect on the superior performance of HFs and finds a positive 
(concave) relationship between HF returns and the restrictions imposed by private investment funds 
and concludes that a positive alpha can be interpreted as compensation for holding illiquid fund shares. 
In addition, he argues that share restrictions allow funds to efficiently manage illiquid assets, based on 
the negative relationship between share restrictions and the liquidity of the funds’ portfolio.  
According to Ackermann et al. (1999), another explanation for the superior alphas is the fact that there 
is no practical and cheap way to replicate dynamic trading strategies by individual investors. Therefore, 
investing through HFs can improve investors’ utility even though they have to pay high incentive and 
management fees. So, the high alpha is due to the unique resources available to managers rather than 
their superior skills. Ackermann et al. (1999) are in favour of this argument as they find that incentive 
and management fees are almost equal to the HFs’ ability to achieve superior gross returns.  
<Insert Table 3> 
2.4. Misreporting returns 
In some cases, HFs managers tend to misreport returns in order to impress investors with a good 
performance and, consequently, attract more cash inflows and reduce the likelihood of cash outflows 
during bad periods. This misreporting is also known as intentional returns smoothing. Previous studies 
such as Getmansky et al. (2004) document a high serial correlation in HF returns. This serial correlation 
creates biases in the risk-adjusted measures such as the Sharpe  ratio (see Lo, 2002). Various factors 
may cause the serial correlation. Getmansky et al. (2004) find that illiquidity exposure is the most likely 
                                                            
10 Bondarenko (2004) indicate that the value of the variance contract is estimated from prices of traded options, and that the 
variance return is affected by credit risks and liquidity.  
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explanation. Share restrictions such as redemption and lockup periods11 discourage cash outflows 
allowing managers to invest in more illiquid assets which affect the HF performance and flow-
performance relation. Aragon (2007) and Ding et al. (2009) support the argument of Getmansky et al. 
(2004). On the other hand, several studies suggest that intentional return smoothing is a possible 
explanation for the serial correlation. Profiting from lack of transparency and the peculiar fee structure 
of HFs, managers tend to misreport returns to increase fees. There are several studies investigating the 
misreporting of HF returns, for instance, those of Bollen and Pool (2009), Agarwal et al. (2009) and 
Cumming and Dai (2010).  
Bollen and Pool (2008) develop an econometric model of a representative managerial algorithm to show 
whether managers have more desire to smooth losses than gains, which generates conditional serial 
correlation in reported returns. They report that funds which have been investigated for fraud by the 
SEC12 are more likely to have a conditional serial correlation. Agarwal et al. (2011a) find higher spikes 
in December returns compared to those during the rest of the year, and suggest that HFs increase 
fictitiously their returns during December, by under-reporting returns earlier in the same year, in order 
to get higher fees. Feng (2010) study the conditional and unconditional return smoothing properties of 
both live and defunct funds, using gross returns and managerial incentive measures, and conclude that 
funds with higher managerial incentives tend to be more illiquid and use more intentional return 
smoothing. Furthermore, they find that higher managerial incentives are also related to conditional 
return smoothing, which is an indicator of possible fraud. Managers of more illiquid funds tend to earn 
more incentive fees, whereas funds featuring conditional return smoothing earn lower incentive fees, 
and failed HFs are more illiquid and more likely to manipulate returns through conditional return 
smoothing than the rest of funds. 
Cumming and Dai (2010) investigate the relationship between misreported returns and HF regulations. 
They find a positive association between wrappers13 and misreporting, particularly for funds that do not 
have a lockup provision. They also find some evidence that misreporting is less common among funds 
in jurisdictions with minimum capitalization requirements and restrictions on the location of key service 
providers14. Cassar and Gerakos (2010) investigate the extent to which HF managers smooth self-
reported returns by observing the mechanisms used to price the fund’s investment positions and report 
their performance to investors, which enable them to differentiate between asset illiquidity and the 
misreporting-based explanations. They conclude that funds using less verifiable pricing sources and 
funds that provide managers with more discretion in pricing investment positions are more likely to 
                                                            
11 Lockup refers to the initial amount of time during which investors are prohibited from withdrawing their investment. The 
period between two consecutive pre-specified redemption dates is called the redemption period. 
12 SEC: The US securities and exchange commission 
13 Wrappers are financial products which are sold as tied products in order to avoid the same level of regulatory scrutiny as 
that which would require if sold via other distribution channels.  
14 For HFs key service providers include prime brokers, administrators, and distributors. 
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have returns consistent with intentional smoothing. Traditional controls, however, such as removing the 
manager from the setting and reporting of the fund’s net asset value and the use of reputable auditors 
and administrators, are not associated with lower levels of smoothing. With respect to asset illiquidity 
versus misreporting, investment style and portfolio characteristics explain 14.0–24.3% of the variation 
in their smoothing measures, with pricing controls explaining an additional 4.1–8.8%, which suggests 
that asset illiquidity is the major factor driving the anomalous properties of self-reported HF returns. 
<Insert Table 4> 
3. Risk management characteristics 
3.1. Risk-return measurements 
Mutual funds (MFs) are considered to be a good starting point to understand the behaviour and 
performance of HFs since both attract investors due to the return premium they promise. Nevertheless, 
they use very different investment strategies and mutual funds are much more regulated, for instance 
they can only hold long positions in liquid assets, and follow frequently a buy-and-hold strategy, 
whereas HFs follow more dynamic and risky investment strategies.  
Early studies such as those of Liang (1999) and Ackermann et al. (1999), compare the risk-return 
characteristics of HFs and MFs using the Sharpe  ratios (for returns) and standard deviations (for risk) 
and conclude that the HFs offer a better risk-adjusted trade-off than the MFs. Despite this advantage of 
the HFs over MFs, the above studies also conclude that HFs do not always have higher Sharpe ratios if 
compared with market indices. This finding has been, however, criticized because the Sharpe ratio used 
as a risk-adjusted performance measure is based on the mean-variance theory and is, therefore, unable 
to capture non-normal distribution returns of the HF returns.  
Several studies such as those of Fung and Hsieh (1997), Fung and Hsieh (2001), Amin and Kat (2003), 
Agarwal and Naik (2004), and Eling (2006) show that the use of dynamic option-like trading strategies 
in HFs leads to nonlinear payoffs. In addition, Lo (2002) argues that the use of the Sharpe  ratio in the 
presence of serial correlation in monthly returns causes an upward bias in the Sharpe  ratio, and 
Goetzmann et al. (2002) shows that it is possible to manipulate the Sharpe  ratio using dynamic option-
like strategies which change the probability distribution of the returns. Liang and Park (2007) analyze 
the risk-return trade-off in HFs using alternative risk measures such as semi-deviation, Value at Risk 
(VaR), expected shortfall and tail risk, and compare these risk measures with standard deviation, and 
conclude that skewness and kurtosis should not be ignored in HF risk analysis.  
There are limitations on the single risk-return measures such as mean-deviation ratio in terms of 
capturing the complete risk-return profile for HFs. To avoid such limitations, Kumar et al. (2010) 
develop a robust framework for HF evaluation using a variety of classical risk-return measures through 
the implementation of a slack-based data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to determine a single 
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performance indicator. They implement the slack-based DEA model using advanced risk-return 
measurements such as (VaR), Lower and higher partial moments, skewness and drawdown. In addition, 
they compare the DEA ranking with other traditional financial ratios such as Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, 
and Calmar ratio15. This methodology has been adopted by other researchers such as Gregoriou and 
Rouah (2003), Gregoriou et al. (2005), Nguyen-Thi-Thanh (2006) and Eling (2006).  
<Insert Table 5> 
3.2. Systemic risk  
The scrutiny of HF practices by regulators increased significantly after the attack on sterling by George 
Soros’ fund in 1992 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997.16 Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999) conduct 
a study on the role of HFs in the financial markets, where they investigate the HFs’ activities and 
implications of regulatory policy changes for the financial markets. They interview several major 
players in the HF industry and conclude that the capital held by HFs poses a small risk compared to the 
large amount of capital held by other major financial market players such as banks, insurance companies, 
and corporations, and are of the view that HFs are not able to influence or manipulate market stability 
and reject the presence of herding behaviour17 in the HF industry.  
Fung and Hsieh (2000) extend the Eichengreen and Mathieson (1999) work and study the effect of HFs 
on financial market stability. They obtain mixed results, some supporting the view that HFs did affect 
the market during the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992, the European bond market rally in 
1993 and the subsequent decline in 1994, and others showing that HFs did not affect the development 
of extreme market events such as the stock market crash in 1987, the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994, the 
Asian Currency Crisis of 1997, and did not manipulate the markets or had herding behaviours. 
After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and its subsequent effects on the failure 
of other HFs, Chan et al. (2005) suggest that the HF industry was involved in systemic risk18 exposure. 
They note that the HF industry has a strong relationship with the banking sector through the banks’ 
trading units that invest in and lend to HFs. Consequently, HFs risk exposures can affect significantly 
the banking sector increasing systemic risk. Hence, they develop new risk measures for HFs such as 
illiquidity risk exposure which quantifies the potential effect of HFs on the systemic risk of the market, 
and use risk models, such as nonlinear factor models and aggregate measures of volatility and financial 
distress, based on regime-switching.  
                                                            
15 Ratios used to measure the performance of HFs. 
16 Soros’s fund earns an estimated $1.1 billion from the Bank of England due to its short selling in pounds. 
17 Herding behaviour is the tendency for individuals to mimic the actions (rational or irrational) of a larger group. 
18 Systemic Risk: “The risk of a major and rapid disruption in one or more of the core functions of the financial system caused 
by the initial failure of one or more financial firms or a segment of the financial system” (see Dixon et al, 2012). 
 ©2018, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
11 
 
Dixon et al. (2012) examine  the extent to which HFs contributed to the increase of systemic risk and 
subsequent near-collapse of the world’s financial system during the 2007 financial crisis and how the 
recent financial-reform legislation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform, and Consumer Protection Act 
of 201019, resolves or mitigates the potential systemic risks added by the HFs. They interview 45 
respondents, including HF managers, lawyers, investors, regulators, staff of industry associations, 
congressional staff, researchers and policy analysts, and collect data related to the processes under 
which HF operate and the HF performance, and conclude that HFs can contribute to systemic risk, but 
are not the primary cause of the financial crisis and financial stability. 
<Insert Table 6> 
3.3. Risk management practices 
There is a broad debate regarding the use of the Value-at-risk measure (VAR)20 as an effective risk 
measure in the HF industry. Several researchers such as Jorion (1999), Alexander and Baptista (2002), 
Monteiro and Rui (2004), Gupta and Liang (2005), and Bali et al. (2007) study its merits and demerits.  
Jorion (1999) investigates the investment strategies of LTCM in terms of its VaR and the amount of 
capital necessary to support its risk profile 21 and concludes that the LTCM had severely underestimated 
risk due to its reliance on short-term history and risk concentration. Furthermore, he highlights some of 
the risk management lessons learnt from the LTCM failure: (i) the danger of optimization biases which 
creates huge leverage and extreme sensitivity to instability in the assets value correlations, (ii) the 
limitations of the traditional risk-management tools which ignore liquidity, and (iii) the problems of 
using “convergence-arbitrage strategies” since they tend to generate good profits in “normal 
circumstances” but are prone to big losses when extreme negative fluctuations occur.  
Lo (2001) provides an overview of the RM practices used by the HF industry. He argues that traditional 
RM tools, such as mean-variance analysis, beta, and VaR do not capture many of the risk exposures 
underlying HF investments. He describes several RM practices used in the HF industry and provides 
illustrative examples of the importance of HF in the world’s financial system. Alexander and Baptista 
(2002) analyse the impact of VaR constraints on HF risk-taking imposed for instance by the regulators, 
and compare the use of VaR constraints with “conditional expected loss” (CEL) constraints22 and 
conclude that The C-VaR constraints are tighter than those of VaR making the C-VaR a more effective 
tool to control aggressive risk-taking. Agarwal and Naik (2004) examine the non-linear option-like 
                                                            
19 It is a federal law that brought the most significant changes to financial regulation in the US, affecting every part of the 
nation’s financial service industry including HFs. 
20 VAR is defined as the maximum loss one expects to suffer at give confidence level by holding a portfolio for a given time. 
21 It has been argued that the failure of LTCM was due to the extremely risky positions, with an abnormal leverage ratio 
reaching 50:1, posing a significant risk on the fund capital. 
22 Also known as “conditional value at risk” (C-VaR). The C-VaR is defined as the loss one expects to suffer given that the 
loss is equal to or larger than the portfolio’s VaR. 
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exposure of HF returns to standard asset classes and observe that a wide range of HF strategies exhibit 
returns similar to those we obtain from being short in a put option on an equity index, bearing, therefore, 
a significant left-tail risk. They compare the tail losses of portfolios constructed using the mean-variance 
framework and the mean conditional VaR framework and show that the former underestimate to some 
extent the tail losses, especially for portfolios with low volatility. They also argue that the mean 
conditional value at risk (M-CVaR) measure best suit HFs given that it takes into account the negative 
tail risk.  
Gupta and Liang (2005) use data on around 1,500 HFs to examine the risk characteristics and the capital 
adequacy of HFs. They use VaR-based capital adequacy measures and conclude that the majority of 
HFs are adequately capitalized. In addition, they show that VaR-based measures are superior to 
traditional risk measures (such as standard deviation of returns and leverage ratios) in capturing HF risk, 
and find that normality based standard deviation measures understate risk and are inappropriate due to 
the fact that HF’s returns exhibit significantly high kurtosis. Moreover, they show that VaR is effective 
in capturing the underlying risk trends in HF returns that lead to a fund’s death. This is evidenced by a 
significant upward trend in VaR for dead funds while no such trend is observed for live funds. In spite 
of all the above advantages of the VaR measure, they report some limitations. First, the historical data 
on which they are based on may not include representative events for the future. Second, the risk profile 
of an HF may change faster than VaR can capture.  
Cassar and Gerakos (2013) examine the determinants and effectiveness of the risk management tools 
and management practices of HFs. They conclude that the use of risk management practices is a function 
of HF’s characteristics, such as leverage, the number of short/long positions taken, and the capital 
invested in the HF by the HFM. They further find that funds that use formal RM models, such as VaR, 
stress testing and scenario analysis, performed relatively better in the extreme down months of 2008 
with the magnitudes of these effects being statistically significant. They control for size, age, investment 
style, portfolio characteristics, and manager education, and show that funds that use at least one model 
of portfolio risk had returns that were six percentage points higher than funds that did not use any type 
of model. The funds which employ formal models to evaluate portfolio risk show, however, more 
accurate return expectations. 
<Insert Table 7> 
4. Conclusion 
This paper summarizes the literature on HF developed over the last two decades, particularly that which 
relates to risk management practices (a companion piece investigates the managerial characteristics of 
HFs). It discusses the successes and the shortfalls to date in developing more sophisticated risk 
management frameworks and tools to measure and monitor HF risks and the empirical evidence on the 
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role of the HFs, and their investment behaviour and risk management practices, on the stability of the 
financial system. It also classifies the HF literature, considering the most recent contributions and, 
particularly, the regulatory developments after the 2007 financial crisis. A better understanding of the 
risk-return relationship of HFs is not just important for regulators, investors, and HF managers alike but 
also represents good business opportunities to the HF industry.  
Most of the literature on HF related to risk-return characteristics, report empirical evidence showing a 
declining in returns and their persistency over time and concludes that some current risk-management 
techniques are outdated or in need of refinements in order to measure and monitor risk more adequately 
considering the peculiarities of the HF trading strategies. The literature shows that very often HF 
managers misreport returns to enhance their funds profile and attract investors and that this behaviour 
brings the adequacy of the existing regulations into question. 
The tables in the Appendix are helpful to identify both the gaps in the HF literature and the most relevant 
contributions in each research area.   
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Appendix 
Table 1 – Describes the components of HF returns and the literature examining their market neutrality 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Liang (1998) 
Study market neutrality of HFs 
with traditional asset classes Eight asset class factor model 
Low correlation between HFs and  traditional asset 
classes 
HFR 385 Jan. 1994- Dec. 1996  Study correlation among 
different HF strategies Correlation Analysis 
Low correlation among different HF strategies, 
which make HFs better diversification pools 
Patton (2009) Test market neutrality  
Divide market neutrality into five different 
concepts and apply correlation analysis on 
each concept individually 
Only one-quarter of the funds exhibits significant 
exposure to  market risks 
HFR and 
TASS 1423 
April 1993 to April 
2003 
Cai and Liang 
(2012) 
Study market neutrality while 
reducing the auto-correlation 
residuals in each fund style 
Dynamic linear regression model 
Equity market neutral has a close to neutral 
exposure and a better neutrality than other HF 
styles 
TASS 
3102 (1590 
live, 1512 
defunct) 
Jan. 1994- Dec. 
2008 
Fung and Hsieh 
(1997)  
Modelling risk and return for 
different HF strategies 
1- Factor analysis to determine the dominant 
style in HFs ( Principle component analysis) 
They classify five mutually orthogonal principal 
components Paradigm 
LDC and 
TASS 
409 ( HFs 
and CTA ) 1993- 1995 2- Extension of Sharpe  (1992) model to 
extract style factors on nine asset class model 
Value and Distressed styles are location choice, 
whereas system traders, system/opportunistic, and 
global macro are dynamic trading strategies  
Brown and 
Goetzmann 
(2003)  
Analyzing risk-return 
characteristics of different HF 
styles 
Extension  of k-mean cluster analysis 
Classified eight different styles employed by HFs 
TASS 1296 1989-1999 20% of the cross-sectional variability of fund 
returns can be explained by each style 
Bares et al. 
(2001) 
Examine style consistency in 
HFs  Hard and Fuzzy clustering analysis 
Investment style of a manager may depart from his 
reported style over time FRM 235 
May 1994-April 
1998, May 1998-
April 1999 ( out of 
sample) 
Maillet and 
Rousset (2001) 
Characterize families of HFs 
and defining a representative 
fund for each class 
Kohonen classification mapping 
Identify a set of representative HFs which may 
also be used as benchmarks for style analysis of 
funds 
Micropal 471 Jan. 1995- Sept. 2000 
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Table 2 – Documents the literature investigating the nonlinearity of HF returns and their main characteristics 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Fung and Hsieh 
(2001)  
Test market neutrality in the 'trend 
following' strategy within a non-linear 
context 
Asset-based style model/ Option-
based strategy by using look-
back straddles to model trend-
following strategies 
Proves the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between the trend followers' 
returns and equity market.  
TASS  407 Mar. 1985- Dec. 1997 
Confirm that trend-following funds have 
systematic risk and are not market neutral 
Fung and Hsieh 
(2007) 
Provide an out of sample verification for 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) results Out of sample test 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) correctly predict the 
return behaviour of trend-following 
strategies during the out of sample period 
TASS NA Jan.1998- June 2006 
Mitchell and 
Pulvino (2001) 
Characterize the risk-return relationship 
in risk arbitrage HFs Asset-based style model 
Risk arbitrage returns are positively 
correlated with market returns during 
downturn conditions. In contrast, they have 
zero correlation during normal market 
conditions 
No Database 
4750 merger 
transactions 
used by risk 
arbitrage HFs 
1963-1998 
Fung and Hsieh 
(2002) 
Analyze the common risk factors of 
fixed-income HFs Asset-based style model 
The majority of fixed-income HFs are 
exposed to a large increase in credit spreads HFR  NA 1998-2000 
Agarwal et al. 
(2004) 
Analyze the risk-return characteristics of 
convertible arbitrage funds Asset-based style model 
Theorizes the existence of three 'Primitive 
Trading Strategies' that can justify the 
convertible arbitrage fund's returns namely, 
volatility arbitrage, positive carry, and credit 
arbitrage 
 NA 
539 Japanese 
and 1234 US 
convertible 
bonds 
April 1993-Jan. 
2002 
Agarwal et al. 
(2011b) 
Study the empirical characteristics of the 
key drivers of convertible arbitrage 
strategies and how they impact  
performance 
Asset-based style model to create  
a hedged convertible bonds 
portfolio over time 
1- They compute the returns to a buy-and-
hedge strategy and show that such a strategy 
together with a simple buy-and-hold strategy 
can explain a large proportion of the return 
variation. in convertible arbitrage hedge 
funds. 
Albourne Partners 
1646 US 
convertible 
bonds 
Jan. 1993-April 
2003 
2- The importance of non-price variables 
such as extreme market-wide events and the 
supply of convertible bonds on performance. 
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Agarwak and 
Naik (2004) 
Characterize the non-linear systematic 
risk exposures of a wide range of HF 
strategies 
 Option-based risk multi-factors 
model 
The ability to identify and test the systematic 
risk factors affecting hedge fund 
performance 
HFR 
 NA 
Jan. 1990- June 
2000 
CSFB/Tremont  
index 
Jan. 1994- June 
2000 
Fung and Hsieh 
(2004b) 
Propose a risk factor model that can be 
applied to different HF strategies and 
can overcome the drawbacks of 
conventional asset-based models 
Arbitrage price theory (APT) 
model 
1- Providing a standardized framework for 
measuring hedge funds performance while 
taking into account both time-varying and 
nonlinear risk characteristics 
TASS 1821 
Jan. 1994- Dec. 
2002 
2- Providing a link between conventional 
asset class risks and hedge fund risks HFR 1911 
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Table 3- The main articles examining the persistency of HFs’ alpha and their implications 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Fung and 
Hsieh (2004a) 
Empirically study the existence of 
alpha with both conventional and 
alternative risk factors in equity 
long/short funds 
Fama-French three-factor model augmented 
with the momentum factor as implemented 
by (Carhart, 1997) 
The size factor turns out to be the most important 
risk factor, whereas the book-to-market and 
momentum factors are statistically insignificant 
TASS, HFR, 
MSCI  NA 1996-2002 
Kowsowski et 
al. (2007) 
1- Test whether fund managers are 
responsible for generating superior 
performance (alpha) over time or it is 
just luck 
Bootstrap methodology  
1- The existence of annual persistence in the HF’s 
alphas indicating that these alphas cannot be 
attributed to luck alone 
CISDM, TASS, 
HFR, and 
MSCI 
4300 live 
funds and 
1233 dead 
funds 
Jan. 1990- 
Dec. 2002 
2- Comparing the alphas using two 
models Bayesian Approach vs. OLS Approach 
2- Applying Bayesian approach to OLS increases 
the alpha yield with 5.5% difference between the 
top and bottom hedge funds deciles 
3- Testing Alpha's persistence over 
time  Bayesian model 
3-Confirm the persistence of alpha over time with a 
declining trend due to the fund's capital growth 
(Berk and Green 2004) model. 
Jan. 1996- 
Dec. 2002 
Fung et al. 
(2005) 
1- The effect of alphas on determining 
the quality of Funds of Hedge Funds Regression analysis 
1- Funds enjoying significant and positive alphas do 
have less survivorship risk and take smaller beta 
bets than those who do not have 
TASS, HF, and 
CISDM 
 996 (Fund 
of Hedge 
Funds) only 
Jan. 1988- 
Dec 2002 
2- Study the effect of structural breaks 
on alpha 
Divide the sample into three sub-samples 
(Pre-LTCM, Internet bubble, and recent 
period ) 
2- The (HAVE) alpha funds exhibit a statistically 
significant alpha over the three periods in a 
declining trend. whereas the (HAVE-not) group 
only delivered significant alpha during the second 
period 
3- Identify the main sources of alpha 
over time 
Style analysis for each fund individually in 
line with Sharpe  (1992) 
3- The supply of alpha is cyclical depending on 
both market environment and hedge fund style 
Fung et al. 
(2008) 
Testing Alpha's persistence over time 
on FoHFs 7-factors linear regression model 
Confirms the persistence of alpha over time with a 
declining trend due to the funds’ capital growth 
(Berk and Green 2004) model. 
HFR, CISDM, 
TASS 
1158 funds 
in 2004 
Jan. 1995- 
Dec. 2004 
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Naik et al. 
(2007) 
Examine whether the capacity 
constraints at the level of HF strategy 
is behind the declining trend of alpha 
over time 
7-factors linear regression model and 4 non-
options factor model 
Existence of capital constraints at the level of hedge 
fund strategies  
HFR, CISDM, 
TASS, and 
MSCI 
7610 Jan. 1994- Dec. 2004 
Fung and 
Hsieh (2011) 
1- Investigate alpha persistency in 
equity L/S HFs Standard 4-factors model 
1- Less than 20% of the sample exhibit’s significant 
alpha over time which confirms Berk and Green 
(2004) model 
TASS, HFR, 
and CISDM 
3038 Equity 
HFs 1994-2008 
2- Study the main drivers of alpha 
beyond the conventional approach 
Introducing non-price variables to the 4-
factors model 
1- L/S equity HFs depends on the access to the 
stock loan market and the level of stock market 
activity to deliver higher alpha 
2- Lower levels of aggregate short sales interest 
enhance the manager's ability to take more short 
positions delivering higher alpha 
Bondarenko 
(2004) 
Study the superior risk-adjusted 
returns after accounting for the value 
of variance contracts 
Including the variance risk in the risk-factor 
model 
The performance of HFs delivers negative alphas 
after accounting for the variance risk exposure 
HFR index and 
CSFB/Tremont 
index 
1400 HFs 
for HFR 
and 3000 
HFs for 
CSFB 
1988- 2000 
Aragon (2003) The effect of Liquidity on the funds of hedge funds' alpha 
An extension of the market-timing model of 
Merton (1981) 
Finds a positive, concave relationship between HF 
returns and restrictions imposed by private 
investment funds. Reports a 4-7% higher alpha for 
lockup restricted funds compared to non-lockup 
funds 
TASS 
299 Fund of 
Hedge 
funds 
1994- 2002 
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Table 4- Provide a summary of literature examining the intentional return smoothing of HFs 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Getmansky et 
al. (2004) 
The existence of serial correlation 
in HF returns 
Unconditional return smoothing 
model/ Observed betas, SD, and 
Sharp ratios/ Regression Analysis 
 High serial correlation of 12.1% in the HF returns 
TASS 909 Nov. 1977- Jan. 2001 
Reasons behind the serial 
correlation 
Illiquidity exposure is the main reason for serial correlation. 
Share restrictions such as redemption and lockup periods 
discourage cash outflows allowing managers to invest in more 
illiquid assets which in turn affects the hedge fund 
performance and flow-performance relation 
Aragon (2007) Measuring fund asset illiquidity Probit Analysis A positive relationship between a fund’s underlying asset illiquidity and the use of share restrictions TASS 2873 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2001 
Ding et al. 
(2010) 
Analyze the impact of share 
restrictions of individual HFs on 
the fund flow-performance 
relation 
Piecewise linear relationship/ 
Regression Analysis 
A concave relationship between find restrictions such as 
lockup and redemption notice and fund flow-Performance  TASS 4594 1994- 2004 
Bollen & Pool 
(2008) 
Examine whether managers have 
more desire to smooth losses than 
gains, which generates 
conditional serial correlation in 
reported returns 
Conditional serial correlation 
Funds possessing conditional serial correlation tend to have an 
increased risk of capital flight, as measured by volatility and 
investor cash flows 
CISDM NA 
1994- 2003 
Funds which have been investigated for fraud by the SEC are 
much more likely to possess conditional serial correlation than 
other funds. 
Dec. 2004- 
Oct. 2009 
Agarwal et al. 
(2011a) 
Do HFs manage their reported 
return in an opportunistic 
fashion? 
Gross returns and managerial 
incentive measures 
Higher spikes in December returns for HFs with greater 
incentives and greater opportunities to inflate returns whether 
to report higher gains or reduce losses in order to earn higher 
fees. 
CISDM, 
HFR, MSCI, 
TASS, and 
Eureka 
11305 Jan. 1994- Dec. 2006 
Evidence of funds inflating their December returns by under-
reporting returns earlier in the year but only weak evidence 
that funds borrow from January returns in the following year. 
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Feng (2010) 
Conditional and unconditional 
return smoothing properties of 
both live and defunct funds 
Gross returns and managerial 
incentive measures 
Funds with higher managerial incentives tend to have more 
illiquidity and return smoothing, 
TASS 1033 Jan. 1994- Apr. 2010 
Higher managerial incentives are also related to conditional 
return smoothing, which is a leading indicator of fraud. 
Managers of more illiquid funds tend to earn more incentive 
fees, but funds featuring conditional return smoothing get 
lower incentive fees on average. 
Evidence that failed HFs are more illiquid and more likely to 
manipulate returns through conditional return smoothing than 
the rest of funds. 
Cumming & 
Dai (2010) 
Investigate the relationship 
between misreported returns and 
hedge fund regulations 
Regression Analysis 
A positive association between wrappers and misreporting, 
particularly for funds that do not have a lockup provision.  
CISDM 8641 Jan. 1994- Dec. 2008 Some evidence that misreporting is less common among funds 
in jurisdictions with minimum capitalization requirements and 
restrictions on the location of key service providers. 
Cassar & 
Gerakos (2010) 
Investigate the extent to which 
hedge fund managers smooth 
self-reported returns 
 NA 
Funds using less verifiable pricing sources and funds that 
provide managers with greater discretion in pricing investment 
positions are more likely to have returns consistent with 
intentional smoothing 
HFDD 427 2003- 2007 
Investment style and portfolio characteristics explain 14.0–
24.3% of the variation in their smoothing measures, and 
pricing controls explain an additional 4.1–8.8%, suggesting 
that asset illiquidity is the major factor driving the anomalous 
properties of self-reported HF returns 
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Table 5- The main Risk-Return measurements used in the HF industry  
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Liang (1999) 
1- Analyze HF performance with regard to its 
risk. 2- Comparing HFs’ performance vs. 
MFs.  
Sharpe  ratio, standard 
deviation HFs offer better risk-adjusted return than MFs HFR 385 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 1996 
Ackermann et 
al. (1999) 
1- Analyze HF performance with regard to its 
risk. 2- Comparing HFs' performance with 
MFs and market indices 
Sharpe  ratio, standard 
deviation 
HFs offer higher Sharpe ratio than MFs but higher risk.  
HFs do not always achieve higher Sharpe ratio 
compared to market indices. 
MAR and 
HFR 906 1988- 1995 
Lo (2002) The effect of serial correlation in monthly returns on Sharpe  ratio  Sharpe  ratio 
An upward bias in Sharpe  ratio is detected due to the 
serial correlation 
Not 
provided Not provided Not provided 
Liang and Park 
(2007) 
Analyze the risk-return trade-off in the HF 
industry (Comparison between SD, VaR, ES, 
and TR with SD) 
Fama-French (1992) 
methodology 
1- Strongly suggest that skewness and kurtosis should 
not be ignored when analyzing HF risk 
TASS 1101 Live and 429 Defunct 
Jan. 1994- 
Dec. 2004 
2-  HFs with high expected shortfall (ES) outperformed 
those with low (ES) by an annual return difference 
margin of 7% 
3- Expected shortfall (ES) is superior to VaR as a risk 
measure. 
Kumar et al. 
(2010) 
Capture the performance of HFs using 
multiple risk-return measures at the same time 
Slack-Based Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
 1- The correlation between ranking of hedge fund 
strategies based on Sharpe  ratio and DEA model is 
very low 
Bloomberg  4730 1995- 2007 
2- A significant correlation between rankings obtained 
when implementing different set of input/output 
measures 
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Gregoriou et al. 
(2005) 
Evaluate the performance of HF 
classifications 
Slack-Based Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
Theoretically: 1- Validity of DEA as an alternative 
selection tool for HFs. 2- DEA as a complementary tool 
to other risk-adjusted measures  
ZCM 
614 for 1st 
and 2nd 
periods 
1997- 2001 
and 1999-
2001 The results provide empirically validation that even 
when using non-normal returns in risk-return 
framework, DEA provides reliable results 
Eling (2006) 
Study the suitability of DEA method for HF 
performance measurement 
Slack-Based Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) 
Not able to determine whether DEA is a better 
measurement tool than others such as Sharpe ratio 
CISDM 30 Jan. 1996- Dec. 2005 
Provide rules for the selection of inputs and 
outputs when implementing DEA 
DEA provides additional information about funds’ risk 
and returns characteristics 
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Table 6- The main articles investigating the systemic risk from special HF activities 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Eichengreen & 
Mathieson 
(1998) 
In general, they study HFs activities and investigating their policy implications for financial markets. Therefore, they established 
three scenarios:  
Interviews NA 1998 
1-  The effect of leverage 
usage by individual or 
group of hedge funds on 
the market 
Principle Component Analysis/ 
Style Divergence,  Style 
convergence, Correlation analysis 
1- Support the argument that hedge funds are not able to 
influence or manipulate market stability 
2-  The existence of 
herding behaviour by other 
large investors that might 
impose pressure on the 
market 
2- Reject the presence of  herding behaviour since HF 
managers believe in following unique strategies that 
should not be disclosed to the market 
3-  The use of positive 
feedback trading rules by 
hedge funds 
3- No sign of positive feedback trading strategies being 
used by hedge funds 
Fung and Hsieh 
(2000) 
1- Study HFs’ impact on 
market stability 
Principle Component Analysis/ 
Style Divergence,  Style 
convergence, Correlation analysis 
1- For some market events such as the European bond 
market rally in 1993 HFs activities impacted the market.  
Whereas, for some other events, such as the Asian 
Currency Crisis of 1997, HFs did not have any influence 
on the market  
TASS, Investment 
fund newsletter, MAR, 
Micropal and Nelson, 
and private sources 
27 Oct. 1987- 1997 2- HFs do not act as a single group due to the existence of different styles with unrelated trades 
3- No evidence that positive feedback trading  is used by 
HFs and no evidence of herding behaviour in the HF 
industry 
Chany et al. 
(2005) 
Attempt to quantify the 
potential impact of HFs on 
systemic risk using new 
risk measures on returns 
Regime switching models Systemic risk is likely to increase in the future while expected return will face a period of downward trend 
CSFB/Tremont and 
TASS 1837 
Jan. 1999- 
Dec. 2003 
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Table 7- The main risk management practices used within the HF industry 
Name Objective Modelling/Framework Findings Database Sample Period 
Lo (2001) 
Provides an introduction and 
overview of the risk management 
practices of the hedge fund industry 
NA 
1- Traditional risk management tools such as mean-variance 
analysis, beta, and Value-at-Risk do not capture much of the 
risk exposures of HF investment 
HF indices 
and S&P 500 
index 
NA Jan. 1996- Nov. 1999 
2- Study different aspects of risk management for HFs such as 
dynamic risk analytic, survivorship bias, nonlinearity, and 
liquidity. 
3- A suggestion that it is necessary to design a new set of tools 
creating risk transparency without compromising the proprietary 
nature of HF investment strategies 
Alexander and 
Baptista (2002) 
1- Analyze the economic impact 
arising from regulators and managers 
imposing Value at Risk in the 
portfolio selection problem of a fund 
manager 
VaR Framework 1- Using VaR as a tool of risk management might create major problems 
NA NA NA 
2- Compare the results with those 
arising from imposing Conditional 
Expected Loss (CEL) also known as 
Conditional-VaR (C-VaR) 
Mean-VaR Framework 
2-The  C-VaR constraints are tighter than those of VaR which 
makes C-VaR a more effective tool to control aggressive risk-
averse fund managers. 
Agarwal and 
Naik (2004) 
1- Examine the non-linear option-like 
exposure of hedge fund returns to 
standard asset classes 
Option-based model 
1- A wide range of HF strategies exhibit returns similar to those 
from writing a put option on the equity index, therefore, bearing 
a significant left-tail risk. 
HFR and 
CSFB/Tremon
t index 
NA Jan. 1990- June 2000 2- Compare and contrast the tail 
losses of portfolios constructed using 
mean-variance framework and mean-
conditional value-at-risk framework. 
Portfolio construction 
Framework 
2- The mean-variance framework underestimates tail losses to 
some extent especially for a portfolio with low volatility.  
3- Using the mean-conditional value at risk (M-CVaR) can be 
advantageous in the construction of HF portfolios since it 
explicitly accounts for the negative tail risk.  
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Gupta and 
Liang (2005) 
Investigate the risk characteristics and 
capital adequacy using Value-at-Risk 
based capital adequacy measures 
Extreme Value Theory / 
VaR, and Monte Carlo 
simulation and other tests 
as a robustness verification 
1- The majority of HFs are adequately capitalized, with only a 
small proportion (3.7%) of live funds being under-capitalized. 
TASS 1436 1999- 2003 
2- VaR-based measures are superior to traditional risk measures 
like standard deviation of returns and leverage ratios, in 
capturing hedge fund risk 
3- VaR is effective in capturing the underlying risk trends in HF 
returns that lead to a fund’s death. This is evidenced by a 
significant upward trend in VaR for dead funds while no such 
trend is observed for live funds. 
Bali et al. 
(2007) 
Empirically investigate the existence 
of a cross-sectional relationship 
between VaR and HF returns 
Univariate and bivariate 
portfolio level analyses and 
fund level regression  
 1- The existence of a positive relationship indicating that live 
fund with high VaR outperform those with low VaR by an 
annual return difference of 9% 
HFR and 
TASS 3080 
Jan. 1995- 
Dec. 2003 
 2- A reverse risk-profile for defunct funds that have a negative 
relationship indicating that the higher the VaR the lower the 
expected return.  
Monteiro (2004) Evaluates the performance of VaR and volatility models for HF indices  
Volatility model, VaR 
framework 
1- The critical decision in selecting a Value-at-Risk model for 
HFs is the distributional assumption 
Tremont HF 
Indices 
(CSFB/Tremo
nt) 
2600 Jan. 1994- Dec. 2003 
2- The t-student and, especially the Cornish-Fisher expansion, 
distributional assumptions have the best performance 
3- EWMA and E-GARCH models have the best volatility 
forecast performance for HFs in terms of statistical loss 
functions. In contrast for traditional assets, the best volatility 
model is the simple sample variance. 
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Jorion (2000) 
Analyze the Long-Term Capital 
management’s strategies (LTCM) in 
terms of the fund’s VaR and the 
amount of capital necessary to support 
its risk profile 
VaR and Volatility 
Framework 
Points out risk management lessons learnt from the LTCM 
crisis: 1st, the danger of optimization biases, which created huge 
leverage and extreme sensitivity to instability in the 
correlations. 2nd, the limitations in the traditional risk-
management models ignoring asset and funding liquidity. 3rd, 
the implications of using convergence-arbitrage strategies 
NA NA 1998 
Cassar and 
Gerakos (2013) 
1- Empirically investigate the 
determinates and effectiveness of 
methods that HFs use to manage 
portfolio risk 
Cross-sectional regression 
model 
Models of portfolio risk (VaR, Scenario Analysis, and Stress 
Testing) assist managers in reducing exposures to systematic 
and downside risks and increases the accuracy of manager's 
expectations. 
HF due 
diligence 
Group 
427 2003- 2007 2- The effect of using formal portfolio 
risk models on HF returns 
3- The effect of using formal portfolio 
risk models on the accuracy of 
managers' expectations 
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